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THE ABOLITION OF SIN: A RESPONSE TO ADAMS
IN THE AUGUSTINIAN TRADITION
Ka therin A. Rogers

Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas located the source of human misery in
sin, freely choosing against God. Sin is permitted by God because the dignity of the human creature requires that it be able to make free choices and
live with their consequences. In Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God,
Marilyn Adams critiques this view and offers an alternative explanation. I
argue that Adams's criticisms do not connect with the traditional view and
her proposed alternative entails conclusions which Christians should find
insupportable, including the abolition of sin and the view that God is not
good in any meaningful sense.

The tradition in philosophy of religion represented by Augustine and
Anselm and Aquinas located the source of human misery in sin, freely
choosing against God. Sin is pemlitted by God because the dignity of the
human creature requires that it be able to make free choices and live with
their consequences. In her recent book Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of
God, Marilyn McCord Adams critiques this free fall theodicy and suggests
an alternative view of the source of horrendous human suffering. In this
paper I argue that the criticisms which Adams raises do not connect with
this traditional view and show that her proposed alternative seems to
entail a cluster of conclusions which most standard-brand Christians
should find insupportable, including the abolition of sin and the view that
God is not good in any meaningful sense. My argument is aimed not at
Adams's entire discussion of how the existence of a loving God may be
seen to be compatible with the existence of horrendous evils, but at the narrower issue of her views on the sources of such evils.
For the purposes of this paper I shall cite Augustine as the most important and influential Christian philosopher to advance the free fall theodicy
which Adams repudiates and refer to the tradition which followed him as
"Augustinian". I shall also appeal frequently to Augustine's eleventh century follower, Anselm of Canterbury, who, in my estimation, improves on
Augustine's basic view by introducing a libertarian position on human
choice. ' I take it that the vast majority of the major Christian thinkers in the
Latin west from the time of Augustine at least through Aquinas in the midthirteenth century accepted the basic outline of this Augustinian tradition
as Tshall present it, and that it is the standard view of the Roman Catholic
Church and many contemporary philosophers of religion.'
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I. Adams' criticism o!,lrec will" approaches

How could a good God permit horrendous evils? Horrendous evils are,
"evils the participation in which (that is, the doing or suffering of which)
constitutes prima facie reason to doubt whether the participant's life could
(given their inclusion in it) be a great good to him/her on the whole ... exampIes include the rape of a woman and axing off of her arms, psycho-physical torhlre whose ultimate goal is the disintegration of personality, betrayal
of one's deepest loyalties, child abuse of the sort described by Ivan
Karamazov, ... "3 Adams holds that it is not entirely subjective what might
constitute a reason to doubt the value of one's life, nonetheless one's own
estimate should be considered a major piece of evidence.
This definition of horrendous evil is somewhat problematic. What constitutes horrendous evil is apparently supposed to be belief-neutral, but
surely one's judgement about what constitutes a reason to doubt the value
of someone's life is dependent on one's other views. Augustine, Boethius,
and the Augustinian tradition insisted that the participant in evils was
made by a perfectly good and providential God who holds out the hope of
everlasting beatitude for those who cling to Him. Chosen despair is a sin.
Accepting this belief, it would never be reasonable, even prima facie, for the
innocent victim or the repentant perpetrator of evils, to doubt the value of
his life. In fact it would verge on the immoral.' Be that as it may, the fact of
terrible human suffering is indisputable, and theists need to address it. I
shall continue to use Adams's term "horrendous evils" to apply to the kinds
of terrible human suffering which her list illustrates.
How can we explain a good God's permission of horrendous evils?
According to Augustine, and every orthodox Christian thinker at least up
through the Renaissance, God made human beings good. Augustine very
explicitly rejected the Platonic notion that there is something wrong with
being embodied.5 Tn the prelapsarian condition soul governed body as it was
meant to do, and Adam and Eve were able to refrain from sin and were not
afflicted with suffering. The natural strength of the properly ordered mind
and body were so great that even the sort of suffering which results from natural phenomena in the fallen world could not afflict unfallen humanity.6
If the view that prelapsarian human beings would not have suffered at
all strikes one as implausible, remember that the issue for us here is not
suffering per se but the enormous suffering which constitutes horrendous
evil. As examples of extreme suffering which is apparently unconnected to
moral choice Adams mentions "the father's nonnegligent accidental running over of his beloved infant son, or a person's slow, degrading death by
cancer."7 A possible Augustinian line might be that it is at least possible
that in a world where human beings had lived up to their potential from
the beginning infants would not be left where their fathers might nonnegligently run over them, nor would brakes or steering fail unexpectedly.
Health care would be far superior to what it is such that, if anyone does die
of cancer, they do not do so in a degrading way. Perhaps there is suffering
and death, but it is not unreasonable to suppose that unfallen humanity
might have avoided horrendous evil.' Augustine himself held, following
Paul, that death is the wages of sin.
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Alas, though it would have been so easy to keep God's command,
Adam and Eve disobeyed. In rejecting the rightful authority of the source
of all value and being, the first people brought upon themselves unending
war: a war of rebellion against God; a war of the soul against itself now
that it has abandoned the source of its knowledge and judgement; a war
between soul and body because the soul has tumed away from the source
of its power to govem. Peace cannot be restored by the war-tom human
being and so the embattled condition, with its consequent weakness and
ignorance, is inherited through the generations. Only a radical intervention by God can set things right, hence the Incamation.
If it was the fall that introduced the possibility of horrendous evil, why
did God permit it? It is Anselm who, to my mind, puts the answer best,
and I gather that the standard position of the Roman Catholic church follows his line. In order for the rational creature to gain merit and, in a
sense, contribute to its own creation, it must be able to choose the good a sc,
from itself. But since it is a creature of God's, choice a sc is possible only
through the genuinely open option to obey God or not. If it were made so
that it could do no other than obey, it would not choose a se and hence
would not merit eternal beatitude. 9 In order for Adam and Eve to be reallv
good, it had to be possible for them to fall. And that is the path they chose.
What about the rest of us? We can only be saved by grace, but Anselm
preserves the meritorious freedom of the creature by holding that we can
accept grace or reject it. lO Here he differs from Augustine who, at least in
his later writings, insisted that grace was irresistible. Augustine ultimately
adopts a compatibilist view of freedom which assigns all power in the universe to God and renders very difficult any attempt to absolve God of the
responsibility for sin and suffering. In this paper I shall focus on the strand
in Augustine which locates the source of sin and suffering in the choice of
rational creatures, and avoid the issue of whether or not this is consistent
with his other views.
Adams sums up Augustinian free fall theodicies, "Thus, even in Eden
Adam and Eve are credited with an agency easily able to trigger horrendous evils of cosmic proportions!"11 Quite so. Adams holds that these
attempts "to shift responsibility for horrors from God to humans fail, for at
least two reasons."'2 First, the rational agent cannot be fully responsible
for horrendous evils since our knowledge and ability to empathize are so
limited that we cannot really understand the depth and magnitude of the
suffering we inflict. And secondly, it is not choice alone which produces
horrendous evils, but choice within an environment which renders the dire
consequences possible. God is responsible for the environment.
Neither of these points connects with the traditional position.
Augustine and his followers do not locate Adam and Eve's responsibility
for horrendous evil in an ability to "understand the depth and magnitude
of the suffering" which would follow from their choices. The claim was
never that Adam and Eve are culpable because they set out to inflict untold
misery on themselves and their offspring. Presumably they had no clue of
the horrors their disobedience would produce. They are at fault because
they disobeyed God. On the Augustinian understanding that is the
essence of sin. Whatever else is wrong in choosing evil, whatever harm it
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does to oneself and others, the root of sin is that it rejects God, the absolute
source and standard of all value in the universe. Anselm makes the point
in the most radical terms arguing that you should not reject God even to
save the whole world. 13
On the Augustinian understanding envisioning the suffering your
choices cause is not requisite for responsibility. And this seems to accord
with our ordinary legal and moral reasoning. Admittedly one who truly
understood the depth of the misery he intended to inflict might be worse,
more culpable, than one who did not. Nonetheless we do not acquit you of
murder because you didn't or couldn't appreciate the suffering of your victim. Perhaps the Augustinian can agree with Adams that if Adam and Eve
had actually understood and intended to produce the results which the
Augustinian tradition ascribes to the fall, then they should be judged even
more responsible. Or, if responsibility is considered an all or nothing property, they might be more guilty. Nonetheless in order to succeed in the
attempt to "shift responsibility for horrors from God to humans ... ," it is
enough that the tradition hold the first people sufficiently responsible, and
for that, in the Augustinian view, all that is required is that they knowingly
chose disobedience to God.
The point that bad choices only have horrendous consequences because
they occur in an environment for which God is responsible misses the
Augustinian mark as well. In making her case Adams offers the analogy of
the three-year-old put by his parent into a room with a stove which will
explode should the child tum a nob and ignite the gas. If the parent leaves
the child alone, and the child disobediently turns the nob, it is the parent
who is mainly to blame for the ensuing horror. Note first that for the analogy to connect with the Augustinian position there must be a very good,
possibly necessary, reason for the stove to be there in the first place. The
Augustinian view is that the natural environment and its constituent elements are all intrinsically good things, each of which contributes to the
order and beauty of the whole and may possibly be necessary for the existence of human beings."
And, of course, the force of the analogy depends upon the child being a
three-year-old. If the child were thirteen then the fault would not lie with
the parent since the older child is capable of rational choice. We do not
hold the hands of our teenage children as they cross the road because, even
though we recognize the possibility of calamity, we judge that it is important that they be allowed to navigate the world on their own. The
Augustinian tradition held unfallen human beings to be made in the image
of God in that they were rational agents, and far more successful human
beings than we are today in that they were properly ordered to their creator and to their own minds and bodies. They possessed the native
strength and intelligence to cope with their environment in such a way as
to live free of suffering. Adams has a very different view of human nature,
which will be discussed below, but unless and until she has made a convincing case for her view she cannot import it in evidence against the tradition. The Augustinian position is that God made the world a very good
place in which people could have been consistently happy had they not
chosen to destroy their relationship with Him.
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Adams goes on to argue that, given her points above about how diluted
human responsibility must be, the punishment for sin proposed by the
classical tradition is out of all proportion. It is unreasonable to suppose
that a good God would inflict the suffering of horrendous evil, temporarily
in this life and permanently in the next, as retribution on those who fail the
test of freedom and choose wrongly. Adams mentions a "free fall" alternative to the Augustinian view of the consequences of sin which she associates with some contemporary philosophers of religion who advocate what
she calls a "mild hell." The idea is that, rather than inflicting punishment
on the sinner, God respects the sinner by allowing him to live out the natural consequences of his choices in a hell which is not as bad as the hell of
the tradition. She judges this mitigated hell extremely unlikely. If the natural goal of the rational creature is communion with God, anything less
must mean misery. There is no second best in the theistic universe.
Adams is also extremely skeptical that allowing us to destroy ourselves is
the best way for God to respect our dignity.15
How would the Augustinian tradition assess these points? First, it is
something of a false dichotomy to oppose the "natural consequences"
approach to an Augustinian punitive view of earthly suffering and hell.
Augustine and the tradition do indeed speak of the justice of the punishment inflicted upon the sinner. But it is not as if one could sin and be fine
were God not to step in and introduce retribution. Sin is the rejection of
God, of which the natural and inevitable consequence is the disintegration
of the order necessary for the maintenance of the happy rational animal.
The sinner chooses separation from God, and that, according to Augustine,
is the worst of the torments of hell.'" On the other hand, the tradition
would wholeheartedly endorse Adams's criticism of a "mild" hell. In the
final analysis, if you are not for God you are against Him, and there is
nothing worse than that.
What of the point that a good God could not stand back and let us
destroy ourselves? I will have more to sayan the dispute between Adams
and the tradition on the question of what is due to human dignity. Here I
would like to mention briefly that from a purely philosophical point of
view, it is not clear that the traditional free fall approach is inconsistent
with universalism. Let me hasten to add that I am not myself defending
the universalist position. My own method in philosophizing about religion
is to weight the tradition of the Church very heavily and the tradition has
clearly taken Scripture in its more obvious sense which entails that some
are damned. I merely want to suggest that this is not a conclusion which is
entailed by free fall theodicy.
There are universalist scenarios consonant with at least certain aspects of
the Augustinian approach. Anselm argued that while grace is necessary
for salvation, the human being can accept or reject it. It is logically possible,
though Anselm takes it to conflict with tradition and Scripture, that God
offers grace to everybody, and everybody freely accepts it, so all are saved.
Apparently it would also be logically possible for all to reject it and be
damned, but given that there is a radical asymmetry between the choice for
God and the choice against Him in that the former leads to eternal beatitude
and the latter to endless misery it seems that the possibility of universal sal-
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vation is far more real than the possibility of universal damnation.
A second option might be that those who freely accept grace and are
saved receive the sort of beatitude consonant with their merit as rational
agents who have chosen from themselves to love God, while those who reject
God are stripped of their freedom and caused to choose Him. Thus everyone is saved, although there will be two ranks in the heavenly multitude
and presumably two grades of beatitude. The forcibly saved might enjoy a
sort of "mild heaven." The tradition, at least as exemplified by Anselm,
might find fault with this scenario. He might hold that it really is better for
God to allow the sinner to live out his choices, and that coercive salvation
renders the sinner something less than fully human. The standard
Augustinian view is that even a bad human is a better kind of thing than a
good dog. But intuitions conflict. The contempor31Y philosopher may conclude that for the individual it is better to be a happy sub- or at least unfreehuman than an everlastingly miserable and/ or disintegrating human. So, if
it could be proven that a good God must provide everlasting happiness for
all his rational creatures, the free fall theodicist has coherent options.!'
II. Adams's alternative account of the source ofllllrrendous evils

Rather than blame horrendous evil on human sin, Adams offers an alternative account built upon two key elements; the metaphysical size gap
between God and man, and a conception of evil which, rather than focusing on morally bad choices, draws on the paradigm of "uncleanness and
purity". Adams also discusses "honor and shame" but it is unclear how
or whether she intends this alternate paradigm to help explain our current
susceptibility to horrendous evil. I shall discuss only the "uncleanness"
paradigm.
Adams and the Augustinian tradition agree that much contemporary
philosophy of religion posits a God who is too small, who is bound by
external moral rules and so is not the absolutely independent source of all.
They agree that God is not just another, bigger, member of our moral community. But Adams goes further. Not only is God bigger than many contemporary philosophers realize, human beings are a great deal smaller
than either contemporary or classical free fall theodicists imagine.
Anselm saw human freedom as the gift which God gave to man in order
to allow him to imitate divine aseity. Sin and its consequences were the
price paid for this human dignity. In the contemporary literature a popular
analogy of the relationship of God to man is the loving parent who stands
back to let the teenage child make its own decisions because that is the only
way it can become a mature person. Adams holds that "human dignity"
has been greatly overrated. We are not as teenagers to our Father in heaven, we are infants. God would not do us a favor in standing back and letting us reap the consequences of our behavior any more than would a
mother who left a baby to its own devices. The mother's interfering with
the baby's activity can hardly be interfering with its free agency, since it
doesn't have any. Rather the care of the mother is "agency-enabling ordeveloping - in other words, those that supply necessary preconditions for
the "smaller" agent to function at all."l' The gap between God and man is
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analogous. "The metaphysical gap between God and creatures means that
however mature adult human agency may seem in relation to other human
beings, it never gets beyond (up to?) the infantile stage in relation to the
Divine.// 19 Apparently in Adams view the sort of agency which the enabling
work of the Holy Spirit leads us to will never be the sort of free agency
which Anselm and other free fall theodicists envision.
Adams holds that the metaphysical gap places God outside of the
human moral community. The Augustinian tradition would certainly
have agreed that God is not just another moral agent, but Adams associates with her position several consequences which theists, classical and
contemporary, are likely to find startling. At least some of her remarks
imply a rejection of moral realism in favor of a view that sees morality as a
practical human construct. She writes that, " ...human society involves role
expectations and some system(s) of mutual evaluation and accountability.
Relative to my opponents, I have celebrated this fact by dwelling on how
humans have invented and deployed a variety of such schemes-the purity and defilement calculus ... , the honor code ... , and, most recently, morality. Each of these schemes has proved its usefulness in contributing to
social order and stability.// She goes on to hold that she has not " ... denied
morality a place at the table or contested its usefulness in regulating contemporary societies. Nor have I doubted that we have moral obligations ... //
Still, she confesses " ...to the suspicion that moral categories never get to the
evaluative heart of the matter. .. the fact that morality is a more useful
framework for evaluatively challenged human collectives scarcely commends it as penetrating to any normative core!//2U
It is possible here that Adams is using the term "morality" in an unusually narrow way. For example, she implies at one point that "moral categories" are exhausted by "strict deontological or consequentialist approaches .... "" In discussing Mother Teresa, Adams writes that she responded "as a
beloved daughter returning love's initiative ... eschewing moral categories."22
Someone using a broader sense of "morality" might hold this to be simply a
false dichotomy. She certainly implies that some behavior is bad even if
those it affects are happy with it, as her discussion of the degradation of
slavery indicates.23 Thus Adams does not present a developed or robust
denial of moral realism. Still, she says enough to be disquieting, especially
when coupled with the second conclusion she draws from the position that
God is not a member of our moral community.
According to Adams, it follows from the metaphysical gap that, objectively speaking, we cannot behave rightly or wrongly vis-a-vis God. Thus,
" ...because of the size gap nothing we could be or do could count - simply
by virtue of what it is - as an appropriate move in relation to God, any
more than a worm's wiggling to the right could be intrinsically more
respectful of humans than its wiggling to the Ieft. "24 If she really means
this, then Mother Teresa's loving behavior is no more appropriate in relation to God than Hitler's hateful behavior. Adams's view is clearly very
different from tl1at of Augustinian theism. For Augustine and his tradition
the fact that God is the Creator produces both the metaphysical gap and the
bridge that spans it. God does not just haz>e goodness, rather He is the goodness by participation in which other good things are good. Human morali-
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ty, which would include but not necessarily be exhausted by the duties of
justice and beneficence, has absolute objectivity because it is rooted in the
divine nature, and our actions can be better or worse in relation to God
because we can imitate Him more or less adequately within the limitations
of our nature. On the Augustinian analysis it is precisely the extent to
which anything reflects the being of God that it has any value of any sort.
Adams allows that God may issue commands and enter covenants with
humanity. "--God is too big to squeeze into any humanly contrived social
role. But God can create a social order that networks God and humans
together. God can assign Godself a role that clarifies expectations, makes
interactions safer and more predictable. At the same time, the Divine
social order invents roles for us. Just as human civil law confers value,
turns paper worth a few cents into $100 bills, so Divine legislation establishes statutory definitions of what will count as a fitting or appropriate
response by finite creatures to God."25 The implication seems to be that
"sin" in the traditional sense, willing against the will of God, could at most
be a failure to obey a command which is intrinsically arbitrary. This
impression is reinforced when she goes on to offer examples from the
Hebrew Bible of commands of which the purpose "is to separate Israel out
from other nations, by imposing commands and prohibitions that will
make her behavior different from theirs."26 The implication is made again in
Adams's approving discussion of the honor/shame model in which God is
the patron and humanity the client such that "Divine covenants invest
God's honor in the relationship, tum the behavior and condition of His
clients into conventional signs of how much there is "to" God."27 Again,
Adams does not offer a developed divine command theory, but what she
does say seems clearly at odds with the Augustinian tradition, in which the
standard for human behavior is not assigned or conventional, but rather is
rooted in imitation of the necessary and immutable nature of God.
In any case, Adams makes it clear that in her view, human choice is not
the problem. "Where free fall approaches locate the root obstacle to at-onement in created free actions contrary to God's will, and so in what humans
do, my contrary proposal finds the fundamental difficulty in a metaphysical devaluation of humankind in relation to Divinity, and so in what both
God and humans are."2' But why should our being a great deal smaller
than God result in so much evil? There is more to the story.
Rather than looking at a paradigm which focuses on free agency,
Adams suggests that we look at "purity and defilement" which sees sin as
"uncleanness, an outgrowth of two metaphysical rootS."29 Not only are we
on this side of the great metaphysical divide from God, but we are also corporeal. We are hybrid creatures of body and spirit, and " ... the material, corporeal, animal distracts mind's cognitive and evaluative attention, disrupts
its balance, lures it into preferring lesser to greater goods ... Whether normative relations are understood in terms of elimination (as with ascetic aims
to amputate bodily concerns) or subordination (where reason rules but
gives animal needs a voice), theory and experience witness that these are
difficult to achieve, that stable virtue is easily out of reach for most."30 But
God is not at fault for creating us as embodied beings. Matter is not evil per
se. " ... God loves material creation ... "3! It's just that we are spiritual animals
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and this "metaphysical straddling is the source of human contamination
with horrors."32

III. Insupportable consequences
According to Adams we find ourselves subject to participation in horrors
because we are at such a metaphysical distance from God, and because we
are hybrid, "unclean", creatures of body and spirit. A first question, then,
is this: Are the metaphysical gap and the "uncleanness" necessary? Is it
that God could have made us more successful creatures and failed to do so,
or is it that He could not have made us any better than we are? If creatures
fitting the description of human and possessed of the sort of dignity which
Augustine et a1. took to be the essence of human nature could have been
created, one would think that a good God would have made them. Adams
never questions the assumption that the free agents posited by the
Augustinian tradition are made metaphysically closer to the image of God
than are her unclean infant humans. Her argument is just that we are the
latter and not the former. (Proving that Anselm is actually right and
Adams wrong about the sort of freedom and dignity possessed by human
beings is a task which lies beyond the modest scope of this paper. Here I
am concerned only to point to the consequences of rejecting the tradition in
favor of Adams's alternative.)
An Adamsian might suggest that it is better for God not to make us as
the dignified free agents of the Augustinian tradition, since that entails that
we will have the option to reject Him. Adams, in responding to the "mild
hell" advocates writes that they, " ... come close to assuming that God and
human adults are moral peers in insisting that we (like adolescent and
adult children) have the right to reject God and to erase as completely as
possible any trace of family resemblance. My own view is that this is not
the right sort of respect for a being like God to pay to creatures like US."33
Assuming it would be the right sort of respect for God to pay to the free
agents of the Augustinian tradition aren't we safer being infants?
Augustine himself would almost certainly have responded that it is better for the world as a whole to contain the better sort of creatures, and he
would have added that it is better for the creature itself, even if it suffers, to
be a better sort of thing. It is better to be an unhappy man than a happy
dog. 3' Perhaps this is a matter of fundamental intuitions. J find the
A ugustinian thesis plausible. And there is more to be said. The
Augustinian tradition held that at least some of these free agents are saved
by embracing divine grace. And, being made so closely to the divine
image, they merit and are able to enjoy an everlasting beatitude far better
than could a creature much more distant on the metaphysical ladder.
Since Adams apparently grants that Augustinian humans are more godlike, I take it she would allow this entailment. Should God really not make
creatures as like Himself as possible because some might reject Him and
suffer? Should no one enjoy the sort of union with God envisioned by this
tradition because all may not? True, some may judge their lives not to be
great goods on the whole, but others will enjoy the greatest possible beatitude, which would not be available to the lesser creature.
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If it is argued that a good God would not allow participation in horrendous evil to go llllde£eated in the lives of any of His creatures, then we can
add the "mild heaven" option mentioned earlier. For those who persistently reject God, He can step in and treat them as infants, negating their
choice and forcing (a somewhat diluted) beatitude upon them. The traditionally-minded will be llllcomfortable with what they will take to be a violation of the nature of the creature. If this objection overrides the point
about the defeat of horrendous evil in the lives of every individual then the
best world is one in which God makes the creature in His image and lets
those who choose suffering suffer. But an Adamsian might judge that God
ought to interfere with the nature of a person who is bent on self-destruction. In Adams's view nobody ever rises above the infant level anY'vay, so
the suggestion here is that God may simply demote the unrepentant sinner
to the metaphysical position which she takes all humans actually to occupy. And, as in Adams's universe, everybody is saved. The difference is
that those who can enjoy the beatitude of a true imago Dei do SO.35 This
seems an obviously better world than the one which Adams supposes ours
to be. So it seems that God's goodness is called into question if we take it
that He has chosen to create us so distant from Himself.36
But perhaps the metaphysical gap, with its consequent participation in
horrendous evils, is a necessary result of our hybrid "llllcleamless" in being
body and spirit. Adams discusses c.E. Roll's view that "Material nature
dictates an evolutionary process in which created suffering is metaphysically necessary."'7 She does not endorse everything Rolt says, but she does
not seem to disagree with this point. It is good that God should make
material creatures including and especially human beings, and perhaps He
simply could not have made us any nearer to Himself on the metaphysical
ladder and so could 110t have made us such that we would not suffer and
do horrendous evils.
The Augustinian tradition consistently and adamantly denied this suggestion. Nobody knew better than Augustine that being embodied could
cause terrible problems, but the very fact that we suffer and struggle and
are at war with ourselves indicates that there is a proper order, a peace
which is natural to US. 38 We recognize that something is wrong. In our present condition it is difficult for spirit to govern bodily appetites, but that is
not to say that it is metaphysically impossible. Most of us manage some of
the time, and some of us manage most of the time. It is clearly conceivable
that God could have made us such that all of us could manage all the time.
Some things Adams says might suggest that she is not entirely at odds
with this position. For example she writes, "".human heterogeneity makes
it extremely difficult for us to "get our acts together" to move towards
virtue,,,."l'! This could imply that it is difficult, but not impossible for us to
rise above the uncleanness of our hybrid nature. And again, she castigates
those who would, "overestimate the capacity to subdue, with discipline,
one's "lower" nature and to shoulder the responsibility to decide one's
own destiny.""O To "overestimate" is quite different from imagining what
does not exist."'
But it seems to me that the bulk of the texts support the interpretation
that in Adams's view human nature is intrinsically "defiled" such that we
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could not possibly choose to rise above participation in horrendous evils.
Adams says, " ... at the most basic level, sin is uncleanness, an outgrowth of
two metaphysical roots [the metaphysical gap and the hybrid
nature] .... Human uncleanness is thus a consequence of twin metaphysical
necessities. The metaphysical gap results from what the Divine essence and
human nature are, quite apart from any exercise of either agency .... The issue
is not one of individual misbehavior or unique conditions, but pertains to
humans insofar as they are members of humankind [italics in the original
text]."42 And the following seems a clear statement of the impossibility of a
human nature which is intrinsically properly ordered, as opposed to being
fixed by divine intervention: "Through the lens of purity and defilement
categories, we can see clearly how obstacles to Divine-human at-one-ment
[the metaphysical gap and our dualistic nature] are irresolvable apart from
superhuman powers to organize and to mend, to reclassify and to harmonize into an inclusive functional unity, ... God alone has the creative imagination and persuasive power to organize utopian society."'] It seems fair to
conclude that the "sin" of uncleanness is unavoidable, according to Adams.
Perhaps she does not entirely deny human freedom, but were it to play any
significant role in her story this would undermine her basic theme of offering alternatives to what she sees as the failure of the free fall strategy.
In supporting her view against the Augustinian position, Adams holds
that, " ... the lens of purity and defilement focuses the difficulties caused by
metaphysical straddling, allows us to take seriously our experience of
human agency confronted by horrors, and to replace a priori idealized
models with a more empirical psychology."44 Regarding the point about
"empirical psychology" the Augustinian will respond that the social sciences deal with mankind as it is. The traditional view is that man is as he
is because of his failure at the pre-dawn of history. Contemporary psychology is not in a position to assess that point.
Moreover, contrary to Adams's point about taking seriously "our experience of human agency confronted by horrors," the phenomenology of
evil, at least of the evil of sin, will not allow that our behavior is a consequence of our status as spiritual animals struggling to survive. There is
nothing really wrong with the fox eating the rabbit or the lion killing the
cubs of its rival. Mammals mammaling may cause and endure suffering,
but they are just doing what their God-given natures require, and it's better
that they exist than not. Auschwitz is radically different. If genocide were
just the human animal doing what God made it to do then it would be
unreasonable to say that it should not have happened. I trust that most of my
readers share my non-negotiable intuition that Hitler really ought not to
have ordered the Final Solution. Genuine evil, in the Augustinian view, is
at odds with God and hence with the entire created universe which He
causes and imbues with value. It is, contrary to Adams's analysis, radically unnatural.
At first glance, Adams's suggestion seems reminiscent of the Platonism
and Manicheanism that Augustine defeated a millennium and a half ago.
For the Augustinian tradition the bottom line was that associating evil with
matter contradicted divine omnipotence. There could not be in the universe a power (with the possible exception of free creatures whom God
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chooses to create) which could conflict with the divine will. Adams often
writes as if the uncleanness associated with embodied spirit has a positive
power at odds with good. Citing Mary Douglas on purity and defilement,
" ... Douglas offers a social-anthropological analysis of cleanliness
metaphors and institutions in terms of twin ideas: that dirt is stuff out of
order and that shIff out of order is both powerful and dangerous."" "The
calculus of purity and defilement presupposes that cleanness is fragile and
dirty is catching. Prima facie plausibility favors this axiom. After all, it
takes hours to sparkle the kitchen, which is instantaneously messed by
spilled milk or muddy shoes." She goes on to add that, "Nevertheless, the
oxymoron of Divine defilement challenges, the New Testament upsets,
reverses the direction of contagion: it's holiness, not defilement, that's
catching!""" God, in Christ, can miraculously reverse the "contagion", but
the implication is that in the normal order, "dirty is catching."
But if, because of the power of defilement, God cannot make us any better then we are, then isn't His power limited by the source of evil? Isn't
Adams promoting a Manichean denial of divine omnipotence? In fact, the
Manichean appearance is only prima facie. Adams's view is not that the
"dirty" has some power independent of God and capable of producing
consequences contrary to His will. Adams apparently sees evil as suffering
which is the inevitable result of the distance we are from God and the
uncleanness of our hybrid makeup. But these are necessary elements of
our God-given natures, and it is good that we exist. Thus it is not the case
that evil "should not be."
Adams's view entails the denial of the existence of evil in the
Augustinian sense of sin. The Augustinian draws a radical distinction
between the sinner and the innocent, whereas Adams apparently does not
see any difference that makes a difference between the victim and the perpetrator of horrendous evil. Undoubtedly she would recognize some sort of
distinction; the perpetrator is the one holding the gun outside the barbed
wire, while the victim is the one with the shaved head inside the barbed
wire. But in explaining how these two came to be participants in horrendous evil and in discussing how that participation is ultimately to be overbalanced by good, the distinction plays absolutely no role. This conspicuous failure to differentiate occurs at the outset when she defines horrendous evils as "evils the participation in which (that is, the doing or suffering
of which) constihltes prima facie reason to doubt [my italics] .... " Nowhere in
the book does the distinction between victim and perpetrator play an
explanatory role, whereas the lack of a difference is reiterated throughout.
"Many are unable to get beyond their contamination and accusations, to
surmount their despair of being able to find any meaning in their lives
given what they've suffered and/ or done."47 " .. .1 am interested in that part
of the work of Christ that sheds light on Divine defeat of horrendous evils
in the lives of all participants (victims as well as perpetrators)."" "In the
crucifixion, God identified with all human beings who participate in actual
horrors - not only with the victims (of which He was one), but also with
the perpetrators. For although Christ never performed any blasphemous
acts in His human nature, nevertheless, His death by crucifixion made Him
ritually cursed .. , and so symbolically a blasphemer. Thus, God in Christ
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crucified is God casting His lot with the cursed and blaspheming (and
hence the perpetrators of horrors) as we11."49
Adams concludes that everybody will enjoy a beatific afterlife. Cod
will provide sufficient concrete goods to outweigh the horrendous evils in
which one may have participated, and sufficient symbolic goods to give
meaning to the suffering. And the story of salvation is the same whether
one is merely a victim or also a perpetrator of horrors. The traditionally
minded philosopher of religion is likely to find this extremely counter-intuitive. How could the path to glory be the same for the one who does evil as
for the one who merely suffers from it? I argued that the Augustinian system could allow for universalism, but only on terms that would not blur
the distinction between the choice for or against God. One option is that,
faced with the choice, everyone freely chooses God. A second option is
that God allows a split-level salvation, with the upper tier occupied by
those who choose Him freely, and the lower by those whom He's had to
coerce. So everybody enjoys eternal beatitude. But in either scenario the
path for the SllU1er and the sinless (were there any) would be radically different. The sinner has to repent. Repentance would be unnecessary, or
rather impossible, for the sinless, if there were any, since they would have
nothing to be sorry for.
Adams, on the other hand, never distinguishes between the road to salvation followed by the perpetrator and that followed by the victim, and
this flows smoothly from her world view. Remember that Adams has
denied us the dignity of being moral agents in the Augustinian sense. We
are more like infants. When we suffer and inflict horrendous evils this is
the inevitable consequence of the metaphysical gap and our hybrid
uncleanness. It is, as Adams has said, a result of what we are not of what
we do. We are not responsible for what we are, and so the perpetrator of
evils is no different from the victim when it comes to being blameworthy.
But this has far-reaching and profound conselluences. The notion of
repentance is central in Christian thought and practice, in private prayer
and in communal liturgy. But if what we do inevitably follows from what
we are, and we are as God made us, then we couldn't help ourselves and
repentance is inappropriate. Adams writes that, "Retrospectively, ... God's
becoming a blasphemy and a curse for us will enable human perpetrators
of horrors to accept and forgive themselves."5l) But her analysis entails that
the perpetrator should instead come to recognize that he has nothing to
forgive himself for since he has simply acted out of the natural uncleanness
he shares with his victim and all humankmd. 51
Nor is it clear that the perpetrator has even behaved in a way which is
objectively worse than the way the victim has behaved. Adams, at least at
times, seems to deny moral realism in favor of the view that the various
codes of human behavior were invented by us to preserve society. She
protests, "I have not denied morality a place at the table [among schemes
which have proved their usefulness in contributing to social order and stability] or contested its usefulness in regulating contemporary societies. Nor
have I doubted that we have moral obligations to refrain from
genocide, ... "s, But if she is really committed to conventionalism (I mentioned above that there is reason to advance this interpretation only tenta-
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tively), then genocide is morally wrong because it will undermine the stability of our society. But nothing in her analysis suggests any objective
ground for endorsing the value of preserving our stable society. Most of us
may find a stable society conducive to our comfort, but those who don't
find our society comfortable or who have other goals besides comfort may
reasonably choose not to subscribe to conventional morality.
She said very clearly that we cannot behave more or less appropriately
in relation to God " ... any more than a worm's wiggling to the right could
be intrinsically more respectful of humans than its wiggling to the left." It
would seem to follow that genocide is no more or less appropriate behavior from the divine perspective than an ant war would be from mine. The
conclusion seems to be that, in addition to the perpetrator of horrors not
being any more blameworthy than his victim, there is no reason outside of
human convention to judge his actions worse than those of his victim.
And this, too, has dire consequences.
Most contemporary philosophers of religion probably find even the hint
of moral conventionalism a grave objection to Adams's view. But if
Adams is serious in her suspicion of moral realism perhaps this criticism
will not trouble her. The Augustinian tradition has a corollary point to
raise, though, which may speak more directly to the heart of Adams's
argument. Adams, though she denies moral obligations to God, does not
doubt that God is good and loving. Her method involves drawing conclusions based on an analysis of these divine attributes. In this she is in agreement with the tradition. But what do these terms, "good" and "loving"
mean, and how did we human knowers come to understand their meaning? Presumably we come to acquire them (or, for the innatist or illuminationist, we arrive at the point where we can access them) through our experience in the world. We learn what it means to be a good and loving person through our dealings with the good and loving people around us and
perhaps by contrast with the bad and hateful people. The tradition held
that we can carry these terms over to God, whether analogously or univocally, because the good and loving person especially reflects and imitates
God, whereas the bad person destroys the image of God in himself.
And herein lies the problem for Adams. The metaphysical gap which
she envisions entails that our goodness is as incommensurate with God's
as the goodness of the infant is with the adult's, or the goodness of the
worm with the human being's. We are all at the same, vast, distance from
God. Further, our uncleanness is metaphysically necessary, so none of us is
objectively blameworthy. And, if we take her moral conventionalism seriously, no behavior is objectively morally wrong. Sin and sinner are abolished and everyone is, in the final analysis, equally "good". Adams may
be happy with that conclusion since it makes sense of universalism. But it
follows that the term "good" is eviscerated of positive content. If Hitler
and Mother Teresa are both at the same metaphysical distance from God
and equally unclean because of their hybrid nature then, though perhaps
by some conventional human assessment Hitler is "bad" and Mother
Teresa is "good", there is no value difference between them viewed objectively and in relationship to God. If this is the case, then our human understanding of the term "good" cannot be carried over to Cod. But if God is
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not "good" in some way which human beings can grasp, then discussion
predicated on His possession of that attribute is vain.
Adams has shrunk humanity to such an extent that our concepts, which
we derive from our experience of the world around us, cannot bridge the
metaphysical gap between us and God. And then it is not possible to
assess how that transcendent God across the gap could be expected to treat
His vermin on this side. Even should He reach across the gap and assume
our nature, His nahlre, modus operandi, and goals must remain opaque to
us. Adams's charitable goal was to assure everyone a place at the table,
but her alternative to classical Augustinian theodicy apparently renders
the term "good" conventional with respect to man and hence equivocal
with respect to God. Her abolition of sin entails denying meaningful
goodness to God. 53
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